Justice John Marshall Harlan as Prophet: The Plessy Dissenter\u27s Color-Blind Constitution by O\u27Brien, Molly Townes
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 6 | Issue 3 Article 5
Justice John Marshall Harlan as Prophet: The Plessy
Dissenter's Color-Blind Constitution
Molly Townes O'Brien
Copyright c 1998 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
Molly Townes O'Brien, Justice John Marshall Harlan as Prophet: The Plessy Dissenter's Color-Blind
Constitution, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 753 (1998), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol6/
iss3/5
JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN AS PROPHET: THE
PLESSY DISSENTER'S COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION
Molly Townes O'Brien*
The concept of color-blindness has long elicited much debate over its
precise meaning and the role it should play in jurisprudence. Such debate
was catalyzed by Justice John Marshall Harlan's well-known Plessy dissent.
In the wake of the efforts of both civil rights activists and conservatives to
use color-blindness to further their respective goals, Professor O'Brien
seeks to clarify Harlan's vision of color-blind jurisprudence and examines
the ways in which recent Supreme Court decisions echo Harlan's concepts
regarding a color-blind constitution.
Professor O'Brien first provides a brief introduction to the concept of
color-blindness. O'Brien then examines Harlan's experiences in politics and
war to explain the bases of Harlan's beliefs, which O'Brien argues were
steeped in white paternalism and Republican federalism. By analyzing
Harlan's decisions in several key cases, O'Brien pinpoints two consistencies
in Harlan's race jurisprudence: his commitment to federalism and his belief
that for a court to find that a plaintiff has been racially discriminated
against, the discrimination must have been explicit and purposeful. Finally,
O'Brien adresses the limitations of constitutional color-blindness and the
ways in which current members of the Supreme Court continue to echo Har-
lan's opinions regarding the interaction between federalism and color-blind
racial justice.
Professor O'Brien concludes that although John Marshall Harlan was
prophetic in his prediction that legally sanctioned segregation would place
minorities in a position of legal inferiority, Harlan's world-view caused him
to fail to address pervasive prejudice against African-Americans by elevat-
ing formal equality and federalism concerns above social realities and re-
medial needs. Additionally, O'Brien concludes that, like Harlan, the current
Supreme Court unnecessarily has limited its remedial power with regard to
racial justice.
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Taylor for their insightful comments on earlier drafts. Finally, thanks to professors
Marina Angel, Jane Baron, Ann Bartow, Rick Greenstein, Eleanor Myers, and Deborah
Zalesne for their support and advice.
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In his well-known dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson', Justice John Marshall
Harlan spoke with the voice of a prophet. He accurately predicted that the
effect of legally sanctioned segregation would be to "place in a condition of
legal inferiority a large body of American citizens."2 Harlan could not have
foreseen, however, the continuing debate over his proclamation that "[o]ur
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens."3 More than one hundred years after Plessy, Harlan's language
"has become an important cultural text,"4 whose meaning and merit increas-
ingly are disputed.5
For years, legal color-blindness was a central goal of civil rights activ-
ists.6 To scholars like Andrew Kull, author of The Color-Blind Constitution,
color-blindness continues to hold promise as a tool to be used in achieving
racial equality.7 Recently, however, the color-blind principle has been used
as a rallying cry for conservatives who have sought to dismantle affirmative
action and other race-conscious programs. Color-blindness is presently
viewed by many scholars as a weapon in a battle against minority efforts to
improve equality Neil Gotanda, for example, has argued that color-blind
1 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
I d. at 563 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For an excellent history of mandatory segrega-
tion laws, see C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (3d rev. ed. 1974).
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Re-reading Justice Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 961.
' The current Supreme Court is deeply divided on the issue of color-blindness.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas have "committed
themselves to the principle that government can almost never classify citizens on the
basis of race." Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 791, 791
(1996); see also Cedric Merlin Powell, Blinded By Color: The New Equal Protection,
the Second Deconstruction, and Affirmative Inaction, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 191, 205
nn.65-68 (1997) (describing the various current Justices' positions on color-blindness);
Ronald Turner, The Dangers of Misappropriation: Misusing Martin Luther King, Jr.'s
Legacy To Prove the Colorblind Thesis, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101, 109 n.44 (1996)
(citing arguments by Supreme Court Justices for and against constitutional color-blind-
ness).
6 See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 22-39, 138-63 (1992)
(describing color-blindness as a goal of nineteenth-century abolitionists and later civil
rights activists, including the NAACP).
' Professor Kull wrote: "A scrupulous nondiscrimination may yet prove, because of
the limitations of human justice, to be the most effective contribution that law (as dis-
tinct from political action) can make to the achievement of racial equality in this coun-
try." Id. at 222. Among the other contemporary scholars who have endorsed color-blind
decision making as a means to achieve greater racial equality are Stephen Carter and
Randall Kennedy. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMA-
TIVE ACTION BABY (1991); Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1745 (1989).
8 See Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 961; Frank R. Parker, The Damaging Conse-
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constitutionalism is "a collection of legal themes functioning as racial ideol-
ogy [and] foster[ing] white racial domination."9
Harlan, himself, did not explain the meaning nor foresee the effect of
color-blind adjudication."0 Nevertheless, in Cumming v. Richmond County
Board of Education," Harlan, writing for a unanimous majority, presented
a view of the remedial limitations of constitutional or jurisprudential color-
blindness. Cumming, in which the Court let stand a decision by a white
school board to close the county's only black high school, 2 is frequently
viewed as a surprising philosophical turnaround for Justice Harlan, 3 who
dissented eloquently in Plessy. The Cumming decision, however, is not a
philosophical turnaround. Instead, it is consistent not only with the judicial
philosophy of Justice Harlan, but also with the concept of constitutional col-
or-blindness. A survey of the life and decisions of Justice John Marshall
Harlan demonstrates that Harlan's color-blind jurisprudence was steeped in
white paternalism and Republican federalism. Harlan's world-view led him
to develop race jurisprudence in which constitutionally cognizable discrimi-
nation could be found only in the language of state law or in intentionally
harmful racist acts, which could be individually identified and punished. 4
quences of the Rehnquist Court's Commitment to Color-Blindness Versus Racial Justice,
45 AM. U. L. REV. 763, 773 (1996).
9 Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 2 (1991).
" See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.").
" 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
12 See id. at 545.
" Harlan's decision in Cumming has been described as an "enduring puzzle" and
has given rise to divergent descriptions of his civil rights record. LOREN P. BETH, JOHN
MARSHALL HARLAN: THE LAST WHIG JUSTICE 235 (1992); See also C. Vann Wood-
ward, The Case of the Louisiana Traveler, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE
CONSTITUTION 171 (John Garraty ed., rev. ed. 1987) (describing Harlan as "a Southern
gentleman and a slaveholder, and at heart a conservative"). Other scholars, particularly
Alan Westin, Harlan's official biographer, have depicted Harlan as a transformed South-
erner, a champion of civil rights and civil liberties, who as a Justice developed a "liber-
al pattern" that ultimately led to his fame as "The Great Dissenter." Alan F. Westin,
Mr. Justice Harlan, in MR. JUSTICE 122 (Allison Dunham & Philip B. Kurland eds.,
rev. ed. 1964); see also BETH, supra, at 226 (concurring that Harlan "made his enduring
reputation" in liberal dissent, but cautioning not to overlook his paternalistic attitudes
toward blacks, and thus not to think of him as a twentieth-century liberal); Florian
Bartosic, The Constitution, Civil Liberties and John Marshall Harlan, 46 KY. L.J. 407
(1958); Alan F. Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Ne-
groes: The Transformation of a Southerner, 66 YALE L.J. 637 (1957) [hereinafter
Westin, Transformation]. J. Morgan Kousser, in reviewing the Cumming case, seriously
questions Justice Harlan's "devotion to civil rights." J. Morgan Kousser, Separate But
Not Equal: The Supreme Court's First Decision on Racial Discrimination in Schools,
46 J. S. HIST. 17, 18 (1980).
14 Professor Alan Freeman has described this concept of racial discrimination as the
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In Cumming, and in his other decisions involving race issues, Harlan failed
to address the pervasive and continuing subordination of African-Americans;
his decisions elevated formal equality and federalism concerns above social
realities and remedial needs.
The Cumming case is, indeed, a prophetic example of modern "color-
blind" jurisprudence, which implicitly incorporates the world-view of white
paternalism and Republican federalism. In his Cumming decision, Justice
Harlan looked in vain for any evidence that the white school board acted out
of an intent to harm black children. Finding none, Harlan made a "color-
blind" decision that dealt a serious blow to black efforts to require white
school boards to provide equal educational facilities for black children. 5
Almost one hundred years later, a Supreme Court that has begun to harken
back to Harlan's idea of constitutional color-blindness" has reversed a dis-
trict court's order that was designed to remedy the effects of discrimination
in education, 7 invalidated a congressionally mandated affirmative action
program, 8 and voided newly created majority-minority voting districts. 9
From Cumming to the present, color-blind jurisprudence has sought to root
out color-conscious legal standards and identifiable acts of intentional dis-
crimination, but has ignored the pervasively discriminatory reality faced by
black plaintiffs and has failed to provide a remedy for racial injustice.
"perpetrator perspective," from which one views discrimination "not as conditions but
as actions, or series of actions, inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator." Alan David
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Criti-
cal Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY 29 (Kimberle Cre-
nshaw et al. eds., 1995).
"S See infra notes 72-106 and accompanying text.
16 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)
("[G]overnment can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of
race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction.")
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 2119 ("[U]nder
our Constitution, the government may not make distinctions on the basis of race.") (Th-
omas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630, 657 (1993) ("Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our
society."); see also references cited supra note 5.
17 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 89-100 (1995) (holding that the district
court remedy exceeded the scope of the defendant's discriminatory conduct).
" See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 212-27.
'9 See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-21 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a
redistricting plan that considered race in formulating district lines); Shaw, 509 U.S. at
642-48 (holding that districts that were highly irregular in shape reflected impermissible
use of racial considerations in determining voting districts).
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I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE COLOR-BLIND CONCEPT
If "color-blindness" had a single essential meaning, or an "absolute
value," it would be the absence of race, or an antirace principle. In terms of
pure logic, color-blindness might be understood as the antithesis of color-
consciousness. Having said this, however, does not imbue the term with any
particular meaning as a tool for legal decision making. Instead, it lends to
the term all of the complexity, ambiguity, and inconsistency that are inher-
ent in "race."'2 Color-blindness, like race itself, is an "unstable and
'decentered' complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by
political struggle."2 Like race, color-blindness may have potent effects on
the construction of other social and power relations and may serve either to
oppress or to liberate.' Like race, color-blindness can be neither value free
nor content neutral. As a jurisprudential term, the meaning of color-
blindness is shaped by the judges and justices who expound it as a constitu-
tional principle, and who are, in turn, shaped by their own life experiences,
values, and perceptions. Each judge who construes and applies color-blind-
ness attempts to apply an antirace principle in a society where "racial de-
marcation is endemic to [the] sociocultural fabric and heritage-to [the]
laws and economy, to [the] institutionalized structures and discourses, and to
[the] epistemologies and everyday customs."24 Each explication of constitu-
tional color-blindness bears the mark of cultural inertia, the burden of prece-
dent, and the full weight of the social meaning of "race."
One thus would not expect to find the jurisprudence of John Marshall
20 The literature of race and race theory is rich and far too vast to catalogue here. A
recent article by Professor Christine Hickman traces the history of American use of
racial categories and cites much of the best literature on race. See generally Christine B.
Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African Americans,
and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161 (1997) (examining the history of race
classification and recommending the use of a separate multiracial category in the U.S.
Census); see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotat-
ed Bibliography 1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159 (1995).
21 MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES
FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1980S, at 68 (1st ed. 1986).
2 See Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, African-American Women's History and the
Metalanguage of Race, 17 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SoC'y 251, 252 (1992) (de-
fining race and discussing the challenge of bringing race more prominently into feminist
analyses of power); see also Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race Reform, and Retrench-
ment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, in CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, supra note 14, at 103, 116-19 (describing the way the hegemonic rhetoric of
race may be enlisted to aid blacks).
' See generally Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity,
and the California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135 (1996).
2 Higginbotham, supra note 22, at 254.
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Harlan (or any other Justice) to be color-blind in any absolute sense.' In-
stead, the color-blind jurisprudence of Justice Harlan reflects his contextual
perception of the scope, nature, and importance of racial injustice, and his
attempt to craft a decisional rule with which to address that problem. A
survey of the life of Justice Harlan is therefore in order to begin to under-
stand what Harlan perceived color-blind constitutionalism to entail.
II. THE MAKING OF A NATIONALIST
John Marshall Harlan was born in Kentucky in 1833, the son of a
slaveholding Whig congressman.' He grew up in a household in which the
treatment of slaves, judged against the standard of the times, was relatively
humane.27 Harlan's father is said to have had "ambivalent, but generally
negative, feelings about slavery."'  One of the household slaves, Robert
Harlan, may have been Harlan's half-brother; and at least one scholar has
suggested that John Marshall Harlan's relationship with his half-brother
gave him some degree of insight about race, or at least an inability "to
deny ... the humanity of blacks."29
Harlan attended Center College and Transylvania University Law
School, graduating in 1852 to begin a career in law and politics. Harlan. a
"strapping six-foot, two-inch redhead" was an impressive stump-speaker and
energetic campaigner.3" Early in his political life, Harlan adopted the Whig
belief in a strong national government and developed an antipathy toward
the Democrats who favored states' rights." During the 1850s, however, the
Not surprisingly, one scholar recently described Justice Harlan's jurisprudence as
"only partially color-blind." Earl M. Maltz, Only Partially Color-Blind: John Marshall
Harlan's View of Race and the Constitution, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 973, 1015 (1996).
26 Harlan's father, James Harlan, was a great admirer of the "national philosophy of
Chief Justice John Marshall" and decided to name his son for him. Louis Filler, John
M. Harlan, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES
AND MAJOR OPINIONS 628 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., rev. ed. 1997). Chief
Justice John Marshall was the fourth Supreme Court Chief Justice. His decisions estab-
lished the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of the Constitution and the Constitution as
the supreme law of the land. He generally is credited with transforming the judiciary
into a powerful branch of government.
27 See James W. Gordon, Did the First Justice Harlan Have a Black Brother?, in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, THE CUTTING EDGE 122 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
2 Id. at 123.
29 Id. Although John Marshall Harlan's father never formally acknowledged paterni-
ty, he emancipated Robert Harlan in 1848. Because of physical similarities among the
Harlans, and because of the apparent special treatment that Robert Harlan received at
several different times in his life, several scholars have speculated that Robert Harlan
was John Marshall Harlan's half brother. See id. at 122-39.
Westin, Transformation, supra note 13, at 641.
" See G. Edward White, John Marshall Harlan I: The Precursor, in THE AMERICAN
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Whig Party was deeply divided by the conflict over slavery and secession.
Harlan, like many Kentucky Whigs, was both pro-Union and pro-slavery.
When the Whig Party ultimately dissolved, Harlan sought a political party
that would accommodate both his pro-slavery stance and his unionist posi-
tion. He was active in the American Party, or "Know-Nothing Party," the
"Opposition Party," and, subsequently, in the Conservative Union Party. He
ran unsuccessfully for Congress in 1859, losing to a Democrat by only fifty
votes in a suspected case of ballot box stuffing by the Democrats.32
Between 1859 and 1861, Harlan worked to avoid war and secession.
When war broke out, he joined the Union forces as Colonel of the Tenth
Kentucky Infantry. Harlan served actively in numerous battles and was
nominated for the post of brigadier general. His fighting experiences along-
side the sturdy Kentucky mountaineers are credited as the source of his
egalitarian ethic. Later Harlan wrote, "When war menaced the country ... it
was the poor and sons of the poor who sprang to its defense ....
In 1863, Harlan's father died, and Harlan resigned from the military to
support his family. Harlan became a leader in the Conservative Union Party,
which sought to steer a middle course between states'-rights Democrats and
the Republicans. 4 Harlan campaigned against ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment and lost an election bid for U.S. Senator on the Conservative
Union ticket in 1867. Harlan ultimately became convinced that the Demo-
crats and Republicans were the only two viable political parties in Kentucky
and made a decision to break with the pro-slavery forces and to join the Re-
publican Party. Harlan would later recall, "'I was an intense Nationalist,'
and the 'great majority of the Democrats in Kentucky believed that their
first allegiance was to the State ....
Harlan's distrust of the Democrats and states'-rights advocates was
visceral and passionate. Harlan had experienced, first-hand, the violent up-
heaval of civil war. Debates over the power of the federal government were
not, for him, antiseptic intellectual exercises, but instead were a blood-
stained saga from which the country had barely escaped. His experiences in
war left him certain of both the dangers of loyalty to individual states and of
the paramount importance of a strong federal government. Harlan's decision
to become a Republican thus was informed by his conclusion that "'the
general tendencies and purposes of the Democratic Party were mischievous,
while those of the Republicans were better calculated to preserve the results
of the War . . . .'
JUDICIAL TRADITION 131, 133 (1988).
32 See Westin, Transformation, supra note 13, at 644.
33 Id. at 647.
34 See id. at 652-53.
35 Id. at 656 (quoting Harlan papers in Westin's possession).
36 Id. at (quoting Harlan papers in Westin's possession).
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In 1871, Harlan ran for governor as a Republican, speaking out in favor
of the Reconstruction Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and
arguing that the only way to secure peace was to "accept the results of the
War, recognize the legal rights of the new freedmen, and end the reign of
violence . . . ."" Harlan is reported to have been deeply disturbed by the
campaign of anti-Negro terrorism carried out in anonymity by the Regula-
tors, the White Man's League, and the Ku Klux Klan. He viewed terrorism
as a threat, not only to blacks, but also to law and order. He advocated
federal intervention, if necessary, to restore the rule of law, saying, "[I]f our
courts are to be intimidated, and the laws trampled under foot by a band of
cut-throats and murderers, I trust that some power will prove itself suffi-
ciently strong to grapple with such monsters."" Harlan also campaigned in
favor of strong antimonopoly legislation and a general property tax to fund
public schools. A plank in his common schools platform called for the lev-
eling of school taxes. When deciding who should pay, Harlan maintained
that "the rich owed it to the poor to contribute to the education of the lat-
ter."39 Harlan sought the black vote, but made clear that he was not an
advocate of "social equality" for blacks.
What do they mean by this cry of Negro equality? Do you
suppose that any law of the State can regulate social inter-
course of the citizen? ... We do not declare as the Demo-
cratic orators well know, in favor of social equality. No law
ever can or will regulate such relations. Social equality can
never exist between the two races in Kentucky.4"
Harlan was defeated in 1871, and again in 1875 in his second guberna-
torial campaign. Harlan supported Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876 and was
influential in Hayes's successful presidential bid. In 1877, Harlan was nomi-
nated to the Supreme Court and underwent a difficult confirmation battle in
the Senate, in which it was alleged that he was not a "real Republican" and
in which his devotion to the Reconstruction Amendments was questioned.
Finally, Harlan was confirmed and sworn in as Associate Justice to the
Supreme Court in December 1877. Although he considered retiring from the
Court to devote himself to the cause of the Presbyterian Church, Harlan
served on the Court for thirty-four years until his death in 1911." l
17 Id. at 659.
3" Id. at 662.
3 White, supra note 31, at 132.
Westin, Transformation, supra note 13, at 662-63 (quoting Louisville Daily Com-
mercial, July 29, 1871).
"' See Filler, supra note 26, at 640.
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Harlan was, by all accounts, an aristocrat and a fervent believer in law
and order. These traits were augmented by his orthodox Presbyterianism and
his belief in the dignity of man. Harlan also was devoted to the Federal
Constitution. His experiences as a politician in Kentucky and as a veteran of
the Civil War left him convinced of the need for a strong federal govern-
ment and suspicious of anyone who advocated increased state rights or state
power. For him, racially discriminatory laws presented a direct threat to the
integrity of the Union that he had fought to preserve. White violence against
blacks undermined the peace and tranquility of a civilized society and de-
filed the dignity of the white man, as well as that of the black victims. For
Harlan, however, social and economic inequality was simply part of the
natural order of things, a result of the superiority of white civilization.42
Harlan thus understood race discrimination in terms of the problems it pre-
sented for refined white society-a society to which Harlan belonged, a
society he perceived to be part of the solution to race discrimination, rather
than part of the problem.
III. JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN'S COLOR-BLINDNESS
Before exploring the meaning of constitutional color-blindness as it is
reflected in the jurisprudence of John Marshall Harlan, one should note that
although Justice Harlan argued emotionally for a color-blind constitution in
his dissent in Plessy, it could be argued that his jurisprudence simply may
be inconsistent on this issue.43 Or, perhaps, Justice Harlan might have rea-
soned differently in Plessy if he had been writing for a majority of the
Court." Alternatively, later political or practical considerations could have
altered his concept of color-blindness during his years on the Court. While
each of these arguments may have merit, Justice Harlan's decisions on is-
sues involving race nevertheless reveal sufficient consistency to support a
theory that they reveal his version of color-blind constitutional adjudication.
42 In his famous Plessy dissent, Harlan made clear that he believed in white racial
superiority and that he did not advocate social equality for blacks. See Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554, 559, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43 Some scholars have argued that Harlan's record on race issues simply is inconsis-
tent. See BETH, supra note 13, at 225 n.6. The inconsistency argument also might in-
clude the possibility that Harlan's jurisprudence was consistently color-blind with re-
spect to certain rights but not to others. See, e.g., EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 99 (1990) (explaining that the drafters of
the Fourteenth Amendment drew a distinction between civil and political rights).
" Justices may feel more free to take what they consider to be an extreme position
in dissent, knowing that their argument will not have precedential value-will not be
law. When writing for the majority, Justices may take more care to present rules of
adjudication that they believe can and should be followed in future cases.
1998]
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Two prominent themes connect Justice Harlan's constitutional color-
blindness:. (1) the elevation of issues of federalism above other policy con-
siderations and (2) the construction of race discrimination as identifiable acts
of government "conceived in hostility to, and enacted for the purpose of
humiliating citizens of the United States of a particular race., 45 These con-
cerns are not necessarily unique to Justice Harlan nor to "color-blind" juris-
prudence. Rather, these are among the unstated assumptions that are central
to Harlan's constitutional color-blindness. In other words, these themes
color Harlan's color-blindness.
A. Harlan's Nationalist Jurisprudence
Harlan's judicial opinions generally reflect a "judicial conservatism," or
a reluctance to revise acts of the legislature by judicial construction.46
Harlan was a staunch defender of criminal procedural rights and of the
rights of the people to be free from government intrusion. He also was a
proponent of extending the rights contained in the Bill of Rights to the
states and the territories. 47 Harlan, however, was first and foremost a na-
tionalist. Harlan, in the model of his namesake, Chief Justice John Marshall,
supported a broad view of Congress's power under the Interstate Commerce
Clause of the Constitution, giving plenary authority to Congress to control
commerce in the interest of economic expansion.48 In case after case,
Harlan demonstrated his passion for the Union and his belief in a strong
central government. An excellent example of the strength of Harlan's na-
tionalism is found in his dissent in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co.,4 in which the majority struck down a federal income tax measure as
unconstitutional. Harlan reportedly delivered his dissent with such vigor that
he pounded the desk in front of him and shook his finger under the noses of
the other Justices," saying that the majority opinion "strikes at the very
foundations of national authority, in that it denies to the general government
a power which is, or may become, vital to the very existence and preserva-
tion of the Union ....
Not surprisingly, Harlan's opinions in race cases reflect his concern that
the federal legislature secure the results of the Civil War. In the Civil Rights
45 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 563 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
" See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 105 (1911) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47 See Filler, supra note 26, at 639; Westin, Transformation, supra note 13, at 695-
97.
41 See White, supra note 31, at 135.
41 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
50 See Filler, supra note 26, at 634.
5 Pollock, 158 U.S. at 671 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Cases,52 Harlan cast the lone dissenting vote in an opinion that declared the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional.53 Harlan proclaimed in dissent
that the national legislature must have the power, under the Interstate Com-
merce Clause, to enact appropriate legislation to protect the new right of
federal citizenship.
With all respect for the opinion of others, I insist that the
national legislature may, without transcending the limits of
the Constitution, do for human liberty and the fundamental
rights of American citizenship, what it did, with the sanction
of this court, for the protection of slavery and the rights of
the masters of fugitive slaves.54
In his well-known Plessy dissent, Harlan again articulated his view of
the import of the War Amendments and the evil of state efforts to under-
mine them.
State enactments, regulating the enjoyment of civil rights
upon the basis of race, and cunningly devised to defeat the
legitimate results of the war, under the pretence of recogniz-
ing equality of rights, can have no other result than to render
permanent peace impossible, and to keep alive a conflict of
races, the continuance of which must do harm to all con-
cerned.5"
For Harlan, the purpose of the War Amendments was clear: "to secure
'to a race recently emancipated, a race that through many generations have
[sic] been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race en-
joy[s]."' ' 6 For Harlan, who assumed white racial superiority, the denial of
equal civil rights57 to freed blacks in the South presented an affront to the
52 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
5 See 18 Stat., pt.3 335 (1875). The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was an act of Con-
gress forbidding discrimination against Negroes in railway trains, theaters, and hotels.
See id.
"' The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
s Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560-61 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 555-56 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (interior quotations omitted).
17 For nineteenth-century jurists, the term "civil rights" held a different meaning
from the current, commonly understood definition of "civil rights." Although there is
extensive debate over the parameters of Reconstruction Era "civil rights," there is gen-
eral agreement that such rights included the right to contract, the right to own property,
and the right to sue and be sued. See John Harrison, If the Eye Offend Thee, Turn the
Color Off, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1213, 1228-34 (1993) (describing Reconstruction Era
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federal power embodied in the War Amendments and a threat to the stability
of the federal government. Federalism, rather than race discrimination itself,
was Harlan's central concern.
This point is dramatically illustrated in Harlan's decisions that dealt with
Chinese immigration. In 1889, Harlan joined a unanimous Court in a case
that affirmed the sweeping power of the federal government over immigra-
tion, declaring that Congress may constitutionally exclude "foreigners of a
different race."58 In spite of the obviously race-based decision making re-
quired by the statute, Harlan endorsed the congressional authority to pass
and enforce such a law. 9 Similarly, in a case in which Wong Kim Ark,
who was born in the United States to Chinese parents, claimed U.S. citizen-
ship and challenged the authority of a statute that excluded him from the
Unites States after his trip abroad, Harlan joined a dissent that supported
congressional authority to make color-based distinctions in citizenship deter-
minations." One might argue that these decisions reveal only that Harlan
had less sympathy for Chinese people than he did for the freed slaves.6
However, when the issue presented to the Court involved state, rather than
federal, power to engage in race-based discrimination against Chinese peo-
ple, Harlan joined the majority decision, which invalidated a discriminatory
city ordinance.62 Thus, some of what appears at first glance to be an unex-
plainable variance in Justice Harlan's record on race discrimination may be
attributable to his perception that the core problem underlying race-based
state governmental decision making was its implicit challenge to federal
power.
B. Harlan's Perception of the Evil to Be Avoided
A second theme that ties together Harlan's race jurisprudence is his
identification of intentional, explicitly race-based state governmental deci-
sion making, grounded in race hostility, as the harm to be avoided. Harlan's
views in this regard first became evident in a series of decisions addressing
understanding of the meaning of "equality" and "rights").
5' The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
9 See id. at 606.
6 See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705-32 (1897) (Fuller, C.J.,
dissenting, with whom Harlan, J., joined). For a detailed examination of Justice
Harlan's record in ruling on the rights of the Chinese, see Maltz, supra note 25, at 999-
1015.
61 This argument is strengthened by a passage in Justice Harlan's famous Plessy
dissent, in which he describes the Chinese people as "a race so different from our own
that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States."
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
62 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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jury qualifications. In Strauder v. West Virginia, a black man who was
accused of killing his wife sought to remove his case from state to federal
court because state law permitted only white men to serve on grand and
petit juries. 63 Harlan joined in the majority opinion, written by Justice
Strong, which held that removal to federal court was appropriate because the
state statute singled out and "expressly denied" blacks the right to partici-
pate in the jury system.64 In Virginia v. Rives,65 however, a black defen-
dant sought removal alleging that a state judge limited jury service to
whites, even though the state jury statute extended the duty of jury service
to "all male citizens,"'  and Harlan voted to disallow removal. Harlan
joined Justice Strong's decision, which reasoned that prior to trial the defen-
dant "has only an apprehension that [his civil] rights will be withheld from
him, 67 and that the federal court should presume that the defendant would
be able t6 vindicate his rights in the state court or state appellate court.68
In other cases in which race discrimination was not apparent on the face
of state jury selection statutes, Harlan upheld convictions in which the trial
courts had determined that the proof offered did not establish discrimina-
tion,69 had held that discrimination in state jury selection could not be
raised by a federal writ of habeas corpus,"0 and had required proof of actu-
al discrimination when the state statutes had required that potential jurors be
able to read and write.7 In these cases, Harlan joined with the Court in as-
suming the good faith of white officials, and in placing a high burden of
proof and procedural difficulty on black defendants who sought to enforce
the right to a jury selection process that did not exclude citizens based on
race.
In Plessy v. Ferguson, in which the plain language of a Louisiana statute
required separate train accommodations for white and colored passengers,
Harlan had little difficulty identifying the intent of the state law. "The arbi-
63 See 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1879).
64 See id. at 308.
65 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
6 Id. at 315.
67 Id. at 320.
61 See id. at 318-22. Another factor that accounts for the difference in reasoning
between Strauder and Rives is the recodification of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and
1870. In the recodification process, procedural elements of the statutes were separated
from the substantive portions and recodified as separate sections. Although the recodifi-
cation was administrative and should not have had substantive impact, the revised stat-
utes provided only for post-judgment removal, rather than pre-judgment and post-judg-
ment removal. See THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 1-12, 490-93
(3rd ed. 1991).
619 See Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909).
70 See Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895).
71 See Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898).
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trary separation of citizens, on the basis of race," he wrote, "is a badge of
servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before
the law established by the Constitution., 72 He perceived such state legisla-
tion to be "conceived in hostility to, and enacted for the purpose of humili-
ating citizens of the United States of a particular race., 73 Similarly, in
Berea College v. Kentucky, Harlan dissented from a decision that upheld a
state law that criminalized racially integrated education.74 Harlan's deci-
sions in race discrimination cases amounted to a per se rule that state stat-
utes that make an explicit race distinction are invalid. Unlike the majority in
Plessy,75 Harlan acknowledged that the race-based state statutes at issue in
Plessy and Berea College were intended to discriminate against the newly
freed slaves. This is the sense in which Harlan is most strongly identified as
color-blind: He insisted that the race line be removed from the language of
state law.76 In the absence of such explicit statutory language, however,
Harlan required black plaintiffs to meet a high evidentiary burden to show
discriminatory intent.77
Harlan's vision of constitutional color-blindness thus requires only for-
mal, legal equality; his vision of equal protection of the law does not, in any
sense, encompass the social or economic equality of African-Americans.
Harlan made this point clear in Plessy.
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in educa-
tion, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue
to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage, and
holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.78
72 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 563.
4 211 U.S. 45, 65-69 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The Plessy majority asserted that if laws requiring the separation of races stamp
the colored race with a badge of inferiority, "it is not by reason of anything found in
the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it."
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
76 See, e.g., id. at 563-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
' See, e.g., Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909); Cumming v. Richmond County
Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); cf
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding that an ordinance that did
not discriminate against Chinese people on its face violated constitutional equal protec-
tion requirements because it gave unfettered discretion to authorities who administered
the law "with an evil eye and an unequal hand").
"' Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Although Harlan was, time and again, the only member of the Court
who argued in favor of striking down facially discriminatory state statutes,
his "color-blindness" was founded on a cornerstone of nationalism and was
shielded from the pervasive reality of racial subordination. Harlan's color-
blindness required the language of state statutes to be race-neutral, not be-
cause of a generalized belief in racial equality, but because of his high re-
gard for federal power and his fear of the social dangers of race-hate.
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF COLOR-BLINDNESS
The remedial limitations of Harlan's color-blind jurisprudence were
revealed in a unanimous decision of the Court, authored by Harlan only
three years after his eloquent Plessy dissent. The opinion in Cumming v.
Richmond County Board of Education79 was delivered by Justice John
Marshall Harlan in October of 1899. The ruling let stand the decision of the
all-white county school board to close the only publicly supported high
school for blacks in the county.8" Nevertheless, the threads of Harlan's ver-
sion of constitutional color-blindness are present in the decision.
The story of the Cumming case begins on July 10, 1897, when the all-
white Richmond County Board of Education announced its decision to close
Ware High School, a public high school that enrolled seventy blacks."
Ware High had been in operation for seventeen years. Without any previous
public discussion, the Board announced that it would close the black high
school and use the money saved ($852.50) to hire elementary school teach-
ers. 2 Joseph W. Cumming, James S. Harper, John C. Ladeveze, and Wil-
liam J. White, all upstanding blacks from the city of Augusta, filed a peti-
tion with the Board in protest, citing the fact that the Board was continuing
to support Tubman High School, a public high school for white girls, and
Hephzibah High School, a Baptist high school for white boys and girls.83
The petition, which had been signed by 155 black Augustans, pointed out
that recently increased state appropriations would provide sufficient funds
for both the elementary and high schools and that the public school law
required separate but equal school facilities.' After considering the petition
and hearing oral arguments from Ladeveze and White, the twenty-eight-
member Board voted overwhelmingly to reject the petition.85
7 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
" See id. at 544-45.
K' See Kousser, supra note 13, at 25.
'2 See id. at 27.
83 See Cumming, 175 U.S. at 532.
14 See Kousser, supra note 13, at 27; see also Board of Educ. v. Cumming, 29 S.E.
488 (1898).
"5 See Kousser, supra note 13, at 27-28.
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The plaintiffs did not credit the Board's assurance that it would reopen
Ware when economic conditions improved. 6 They knew that the closure of
Ware High School was not a simple result of lack of funds. If there was any
shortfall in funding for the education of colored children in Richmond
County, it was caused by the Board's appropriation to the white school
population a large portion of the money that should have been allocated to
the colored schools.8 7 The plaintiffs understood that Richmond County
spent three to four times as much money on each white student as it did on
each black student.88 The plaintiffs knew that Ware was the only publicly
supported high school in the state and that it offered them a uniquely impor-
tant "avenue of mobility" in the late-nineteenth-century South.89 They re-
solved to pursue the matter and hired three white lawyers who, in turn,
brought two suits in Superior Court.9" One suit sought to enjoin the collec-
tion of taxes and to enjoin the Board from spending money on the white
high schools.9 The suit claimed that the tax was illegal and void. The
plaintiffs argued that, to the extent that it included amounts for high schools
that were spent on high schools for the white school population only, the tax
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.92 The
second suit asked for a writ of mandamus directing the Board to reinstate
Ware High School.93 Upon hearing both cases,94 Superior Court Judge
Enoch H. Calloway refused to enjoin the collection of taxes, but did enjoin
the Board from using funds for the white high schools until it established a
black high school in the county.95 Finally, the judge declined to issue a
mandamus requiring the establishment of a black high school.96
In March of 1898, Georgia's high court overruled the lower court, dis-
solving the injunction and dismissing the mandamus.97 Writing the unani-
mous opinion, Justice Thomas Jefferson Simmons concluded that the Board
86 See Cumming, 175 U.S. at 533 (quoting the defendant's answer).
See id. at 529 (quoting the plaintiffs' amended petition).
B See Kousser, supra note 13, at 24-25.
89 Id. at 22-23.
9 See id. at 28-29.
9 See id. at 29.
92 See id. The suit did not challenge the tax so far as it was levied for the support of
primary, intermediate, and grammar schools.
3 See id.
In its defense, the Board filed an answer arguing that it had not established any
system of high schools in the county. It pointed out that state law did not require such a
system, and that if the Board chose to establish high schools, it could do so "at such
points in the county as the interests of the people might require." Board of Educ. v.
Cumming, 29 S.E. 488 (1898). ,
See Kousser, supra note 13, at 31.
See Cumming, 29 S.E. at 489; Kousser, supra note 13, at 31.
See Cumming, 29 S.E. at 490.
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had wide discretion when it came to establishing, maintaining, or providing
support for high schools.9" The Board "could establish a white high school,
and provide none for blacks, or vice versa,-if the 'interest and convenience
of the people' required that they should do so.""
The plaintiffs intensified their fund-raising efforts, retaining George
Franklin Edmunds, a lawyer and highly respected United States senator from
Vermont." On behalf of his clients, Edmunds made an appeal to the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court."0' Edmunds, in what may have been a strategic
error, appealed only one of the two cases.0 2 He did not ask for a man-
damus to compel re-establishment of a black high school." 3 Appeal was
taken to the United States Supreme Court "to review a decision refusing an
injunction against a board of education to prevent maintenance of a high
school for white children without also maintaining one for colored chil-
dren." 104
In his opinion for the Court, Harlan first made clear that the plaintiffs
did not challenge the constitutionality of the Georgia law that required sepa-
rate school facilities for the races.0 5 This is important because in the ab-
sence of a challenge to the power of the state to mandate racial discrimina-
tion, the nationalist focus of Harlan's color-blind mission was missing.
Instead, Cumming presented federalism issues that best could be described
as the inverse of Plessy. In Plessy, Harlan's passion was invoked by his na-
tionalist fervor and his antipathy for any state legislative action designed to
undermine the War Amendments. By contrast, in Cumming, the plaintiffs
presented only a challenge to the exercise of official discretion in a tradi-
tional area of state authority. Harlan concluded that
the education of the people in schools maintained by state
taxation is a matter belonging to the respective states, and
any interference on the part of Federal authority with the
management of such schools cannot be justified except in the
case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured
by the supreme law of the land." 6
9' See id. at 489.
9 Id.
100 See Kousser, supra note 13, at 32-33.
101 See id.
102 See id. at 34.
103 See id.
Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 528 (1899).
loS See id. at 543-44. If the plaintiffs were to have made such a challenge, they un-
doubtedly would have lost their case, but then Justice Harlan may have appeared as a
dissenting Justice rather than as the author of the Court's unanimous opinion.
.0. Id. at 545. It should be noted that during his campaigns for political office in
Kentucky, Harlan had spoken out in favor of segregated education. In a speech in which
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The Cumming appeal did not challenge the power of the state to mandate
racially segregated schools and thus failed to invoke Harlan's nationalist
ardor.
The second thread of Justice Harlan's color-blind analysis is found in
Harlan's fruitless search of the record for proof that the Board had acted
with intent to discriminate on the basis of race. Harlan wrote, "[I]f it ap-
peared that the board's refusal to maintain such a school was in fact an
abuse of its discretion and in hostility to the colored population because of
their race, different questions might have arisen in the state court.', 10 7
Consistent with his other race-discrimination decisions in which there
was no challenge to an explicitly race-based state law, Harlan was unwilling
to assume discriminatory intent in Cumming and instead required evidence
of race hostility."~ Harlan found no grounds to reverse the ruling of the
Georgia Supreme Court, reasoning that the injunction sought would not
provide for a black high school, but would only deprive white students of a
school without giving the black students any educational benefit."° As
Harlan viewed the record, the decision of the Board was not an intentional
act of racial discrimination, but rather an attempt to provide the greatest
good for the greatest number of black children. He wrote, "We are not per-
mitted by the evidence in the record to regard that decision as having been
made with any desire or purpose on the part of the board to discriminate
against any of the colored school children of the county on account of their
race."
110
It appeared to Harlan that the decision, of the Board "was in the interest
of the greater number of colored children""' and that the case did not
present a clear and unmistakable, nor intentional, violation of the recent
amendments. The absence of an intentional violation of the Constitution
meant that the plaintiffs would receive no remedy. Augusta's only black
public high school would remain closed."' A four-year public high school
like Ware was not again available until 1945."'
he proclaimed himself to be in favor of full legal equality of negroes with whites,
Harlan went on to say that "in the public schools, it was obviously 'right and proper' to
keep 'whites and blacks separate."' Westin, Transformation, supra note 13, at 663 (qu-
oting Louisville Daily Commercial, July 29, 1871).
107 Cumming, 175 U.S. at 545.
108 Cf., e.g., Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881) (requiring evidence of actual
discrimination in the administration of the jury selection process).
""v See Cumming, 175 U.S. at 544.
110 Id.
Id.
2 See Kousser, supra note 13, at 43.
13 See id. at 43 n.61.
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The timing of the Cumming decision could not have been worse, as the
expansion of universal schooling reached the high school level at century's
end. 14 At the very time progressive reformers were reconceptualizing the
role of schooling in America and urging high schools to prepare white chil-
dren for citizenship, work, and community life,"' southern blacks were
told by the highest court in the land that the states had the discretion to
segregate blacks"6 and to spend tax money in ways that primarily benefit-
ted whites."7 Southern blacks were forced to use their own ingenuity to
set up their own public schools, with a fraction of the funding enjoyed by
white schools."8 In the meantime, the public school crusade that moved
through the South "made spectacular improvements in white educational
facilities through higher taxes and the fiscal savings of racial discrimina-
tion..."9 In black education, however, the main development during this
period was "the gradual fiscal strangulation of the separate black public
schools."' 2 As public education expanded, whites could depend on the
force of law to condemn blacks as "social outsiders."'' The Court "gave
114 See ELLWOOD P. CUBBERLEY, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, A
STUDY AND INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL HISTORY 501-08 (1934)
(noting public interest in public education dramatically increased as a result of industrial
development, national prosperity, and immigration); EDWARD A. KRUG, THE SHAPING
OF THE AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL 187-89 (1964) (describing the first major expansion
of the public high school between 1890 and 1905); DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST
SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URBAN EDUCATION 182-86 (1974) (describing the
expansion of public schooling after 1890).
'1 See HERBERT M. KLIEBARD, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE AMERICAN CURRICULUM
1893-1958, at 1-29 (1986) (describing the social and intellectual movements that trans-
formed American schooling at the end of the nineteenth century); TYACK, supra note
114, at 110-25, 217-55 (noting that white school reformers worked fervently to create
an American community through education and to "Americanize" immigrant children,
but did not include black children in their design); see also Molly Townes O'Brien,
Private School Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of Racial Politics, 64 TENN. L. REV.
359, 370-74 (1997) (noting that Progressive Era activists succeeded in establishing the
ideal of "education for citizenship" in the pantheon of American public education, while
industrialization and urbanization simultaneously spurred the development of public
schooling for individual advantage).
116 See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding segregation of
train compartments constitutional).
,17 See Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
118 See generally JAMES D. ANDERSON, THE EDUCATION OF BLACKS IN THE SOUTH,
1860-1935 (1988); HORACE MANN BOND, NEGRO EDUCATION IN ALABAMA: A STUDY
IN CO'TTON AND STEEL (1939); MEYER WEINBERG, A CHANCE TO LEARN: THE HISTO-
RY OF RACE AND EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1977) (examining the history of
education of many races in America).
119 DONALD L. GRANT, THE WAY IT WAS IN THE SOUTH 233 (1993); see also Louis
HARLAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL xvi (1968).
120 Wayne J. Urban, Introduction to BOND, supra note 118, at xx.
121 PAULA S. FAss, OUTSIDE IN, MINORITIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI-
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southern and other states a green light to heighten discrimination in publicly
funded activities and discouraged black litigants from seeking redress in the
federal courts. '  Between Cumming and Brown v. Board of
Education"3 in 1954, the Supreme Court heard only six cases that in-
volved separation of the races in education. 24 In all six cases, the high
Court deferred to the legal precedents set at the end of the nineteenth centu-
ry.
V. HARLAN AS PROPHET
In significant ways, Justice Harlan's race jurisprudence presages current
Supreme Court race discrimination analysis. One scholar recently suggested
that "[t]he ideal of a color-blind Constitution is close to securing five votes
on the Supreme Court for the first time since it was considered and rejected
during Reconstruction."'" A majority of the Court has never formally en-
dorsed a per se rule against race-based governmental decision making, and
has continued to allow limited use of race-based classifications for the
remediation of proven civil rights violations;26 however, Justices Clarence
Thomas, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehn-
quist all have endorsed the principle that government almost never can clas-
sify citizens on the basis of race.'27 Furthermore, one hundred years after
Plessy, Justice Harlan's central concerns have re-emerged as themes in the
opinions of several Supreme Court Justices who endorse constitutional col-
or-blindness.
An interesting example is found in the concurring opinions of Justices
Thomas and O'Connor in Missouri v. Jenkins."2 The case involved a chal-
lenge to the validity of a district court's remedial order in an eighteen-year-
CAN EDUCATION 115 (1989).
122 Kousser, supra note 13, at 42-43.
123 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
124 See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Bd. of Regents, 332
U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Gong Lum
v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
125 Rosen, supra note 5, at 791.
126 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (holding district court's
use of racial quota as a starting point for school desegration valid).
127 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,.236-55 (1995); Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642-49
(1993).
128 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995). The intent here is not to address all of the many issues
that the Court's complex decision raises. Instead, it is hoped only that this Essay points
out a few of the themes of Harlan's version of constitutional color-blindness that are
woven into the text of Justice Thomas's and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinions.
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old desegregation case.'29 The district court had found that the state of
Missouri and the Kansas City School District had operated a segregated
school system. 3' In thirty-years following the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown v. Board of Education,13' the school district had failed to disassem-
ble its segregative system. In 1985, twenty-five schools in the district had
enrollments of ninety percent or more black students.'32 The predominantly
black schools had lower-paid faculties and staffs than the surrounding pre-
dominantly white schools, a lower per-pupil expenditure, and facilities that
were "literally rotted.' ' 33 Students at the district schools had achievement
test scores that were lower than the national averages." The district court
entered its first remedial order in 1985, and continued oversight of the
school district during the time preceding the Supreme Court's review.
35
At stake in the 1995 Supreme Court decision was the validity of the district
court's remedial order that required salary increases and remedial "quality
education" programs."
The loudest echo of Justice Harlan is near the beginning of Justice
Thomas's concurrence, when Thomas described the order of the district
court as an exercise of authority that "trampled upon principles of federal-
ism.' ' 137 Although Justices Thomas, O'Connor, and Harlan certainly would
not agree on the many issues relating to the proper balance of power in a
federal system, in these two cases involving racial justice in public educa-
tion, all three Justices chose to emphasize the historic autonomy of the
states in education and to describe the federal court's power in education as
"limited."' 38 All three Justices treated the institutional concerns of the fed-
eral system as paramount and sifted the issues of racial justice through a
screen designed to protect the integrity of the federal system.
A second similarity between Cumming and Jenkins is seen in the per-
ception of the evil to be avoided. It has been illustrated above that Justice
Harlan discerned racial injustice primarily in explicit statutory language
requiring the separation of the races. Like Justice Harlan, Justice Thomas
views the legal harm of race discrimination as emanating from de jure, not
de facto, race classifications.'39 In the absence of a specific de jure race-
based classification, both Justice Harlan and Justice Thomas have analyzed
129 See id. at 2042.
130 See id.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
132 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2042.
... Id. at 2060 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
3 See id. at 2055.
135 See id. at 2042.
136 Id. at 2045.
137 Id. at 2062 (Thomas, J., concurring).
138 See id. at 2061 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139 See id. at 2065 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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whether the governmental actor intentionally violated the Constitution. 41
Interestingly, Justice Thomas searched the Jenkins record in vain for a basis
for a "real finding" of intentionally discriminatory government action.'4'
He admonished the district courts not to "confuse the consequences of de
jure segregation with the results of larger social forces or of private deci-
sions. ' 2 Likewise, Justice O'Connor described the "white exodus" from
the city that resulted in the perpetuation of a substantially segregated school
district as "natural, if unfortunate, demographic forces."'4 She wrote, "The
unfortunate fact of racial imbalance and bias in our society, however perva-
sive or invidious, does not admit of judicial intervention absent a constitu-
tional violation.' 14
4
Thus, in their concurring opinions, Justices Thomas and O'Connor pre-
served Justice Harlan's determination (voiced in his Plessy dissent) that
social inequality and private acts of prejudice are not germane to constitu-
tional adjudication. Furthermore, as in Cumming, in spite of the pervasively
discriminatory reality faced by the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs' tangible
difficulties in securing a quality education, the Court still searched for iden-
tifiable acts of intentional discrimination. The result is what Alan Freeman
has described as a "jurisprudence of violations."'145 Focusing on the lan-
guage of race-based classifications and searching for discriminatory intent,
the Court unnecessarily has limited its remedial power and failed to reach
for racial justice. "In short, color-blind constitutionalists live in an ideologi-
cal world where racial subordination is ubiquitous yet disregarded-unless it
takes the form of individual, intended, and irrational prejudice.'' 46
VI. CONCLUSION
In his dissent to Plessy, Justice John Marshall Harlan correctly prophe-
sied the pernicious effects of judicial approval of mandatory segregation
laws and proclaimed the Constitution to be color-blind. Although he did not
40 See id. at 2062 (Thomas, J., concurring); cf Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver,
413 U.S. 189, 205-06 (1973) (using a de jure race classification similar to that used in
Jenkins). Compare Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 544
(1899).
141 Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2064 (Thomas, J., concurring). The district court had in-
ferred an intentional violation from the prior de jure segregation, the continuing de facto
segregation, and the failure of the school system to take steps to eliminate the vestiges
of the dual system. See id. at 2062 (Thomas, J., concurring).
142 Id. at 2063 (Thomas, J., concurring).
4 Id. at 2060 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
144 Id. at 2061 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145 Freeman, supra note 14, at 41.
146 Gotanda, supra note 9, at 46.
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foresee all the possible future effects of a color-blind constitution, his other
decisions give us a view of the remedial limitations of constitutional or
jurisprudential color-blindness.
It should be remembered that John Marshall Harlan did not set out to be
a champion of civil rights for blacks. Instead, he was converted by his expe-
riences in war and in politics to a fervent belief in the necessity of a strong
federal government, the importance of supporting federal -legislation, and the
evil of state laws that were openly hostile to the rights secured by the War
Amendments. Although Harlan was alone on the bench in his sympathy for
blacks during the nadir of race relations, he nevertheless believed in white
superiority. His apparent inconsistencies on race issues and civil rights are
wholly compatible with firebrand federalism and white paternalism. Harlan's
jurisprudence does not, after all, see all the colors of racism.
